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This paper reports an experimental investigation of Schelling’s theory of focal points 
that compares group and individual behaviour. We find that, when players’ interests 
are perfectly aligned, groups more often choose the salient option and achieve higher 
coordination success than individuals. However, in games with conflicts of interest, groups 
do not always perform better than individuals, especially when the degree of conflict is 
substantial. We also find that groups outperform individuals when identifying the solution 
to the coordination problem requires some level of cognitive sophistication. Finally, players 
that successfully identify the solution to this game also achieve greater coordination rates 
than other players in games with a low degree of conflict. This result raises the question 
of whether finding the focal point is more a matter of logic rather than imagination as 
Schelling argued.
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In his seminal paper, Schelling (1960) shows that in games with multiple Nash equilibria, where one equilibrium stands 
out (the focal point of the game), individuals can converge their expectations and successfully coordinate more often than 
what game theory predicts. This finding has been corroborated using a variety of games by many experimental studies 
(e.g. Mehta et al., 1994; Crawford et al., 2008; Isoni et al., 2013; Parravano and Poulsen, 2015). While Schelling’s informal 
experiments and subsequent experiments have been conducted with individuals, his theory of focal points applies to war 
committees’ negotiations as well as to drivers in a traffic jam. It applies to groups as well as individuals. Abundant ex-
perimental evidence however shows that groups and individuals do behave differently (e.g. Kugler et al., 2012), so it does 
matter whether decisions are taken by a board of directors or by a husband trying to meet his wife in New York.
The purpose of this paper is to experimentally investigate to what extent Schelling’s theory of focal points applies to 
groups. We do not claim that our experiment will unveil how war committees agree on limiting wars, or how firms agree 
on the limits of competition, but we do hope to move a little closer. What we will show is that, starting with Schelling’s 
interpretation of coordination games as games that have a solution (e.g. problem-solving tasks), groups have the potential 
to coordinate more successfully than individuals in tacit coordination games with and without conflicts of interest, provided 
the degree of conflict is small.
Schelling’s theory of focal points is supported by many informal experiments involving two-player coordination games. 
In these games, two players are presented with the same set of n strategies. If they choose the same strategy, they earn 
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games with no conflicts of interest and games with conflicts of interest.
Games with no conflicts of interest, where payoffs are identical in all equilibria and are the same for both players, are 
pure coordination games. From a game theoretical perspective, the equilibria in these games are indistinguishable to players 
who play rationally by uniformly randomising across strategies. Schelling reported that, in reality, people take advantage of 
some features of the game and manage to coordinate on a particular equilibrium more successfully than if their choices were 
random. These features that, following Isoni et al. (2019), we will call payoff-irrelevant cues, can be words, colour, spatial 
layout, symbols, or any other attribute used to attach labels to strategies. To explain equilibrium selection in games with 
focal points, some authors (Mehta et al., 1994; Bardsley et al., 2010; Casajus, 2012) have made explicit assumptions about 
the labels. Labels are tied to strategies, such that there is a distinct label for each strategy.1 Choosing a label corresponds 
to choosing a strategy. Coordination is achieved if players choose the same label. Some labels might be more salient than 
others (they stand out) and can act as a coordination device. Players who choose the salient label coordinate on the focal 
point of the game.
A distinctive feature of Schelling’s theory of focal points lies in the interpretation of coordination games as problems 
that have a solution. The solution is characterised by being unique and conspicuous (see Lewis, 1969). We can therefore 
think of these games as problem-solving tasks (e.g. Lorge et al., 1958). These are tasks with a correct solution. In terms 
of group productivity (Steiner, 1972), tasks can be classified into four types (i.e. conjunctive, additive, discretionary, and 
disjunctive), depending on how individual contributions combine to determine the group’s productivity.2 Problem-solving 
tasks are disjunctive tasks in that the performance of the group is determined by the performance of just one group member. 
In this type of task, groups are often found to perform better than individuals (e.g. Laughlin et al., 2006).
Laughlin (1980) distinguishes group tasks into intellective and judgemental tasks. Intellective tasks are tasks for which 
a correct and demonstrable solution exists. For a task to be demonstrable four conditions should be satisfied (Laughlin and 
Ellis, 1986): the consensus of the group on a conceptual system of definitions, rules, operations and so on (e.g. mathematical 
system, logical system, verbal system, etc.); there should be enough information for the solution within the system; group 
members must be able to recognise the correct solution once a member proposes it; the member that proposes the solution 
should have enough motivation, ability and time to demonstrate the correct solution to the other members. Group success 
is achieved by finding the correct answer. Highly demonstrable tasks are intellective tasks with a solution that, once is 
found, is immediately recognised by group members as the correct one and adopted as a group response (e.g. mathematical 
problems). In contrast, judgemental tasks do not have a demonstrable correct solution (e.g. aesthetic judgements). In highly 
demonstrable tasks, the ‘truth-wins’ criterion, first proposed by Lorge and Solomon (1955), is often used to compare group 
and individual performance (Davis, 1992). The criterion assumes that group members will independently try to solve the 
problem and that the group will select the correct response if at least one of its members has found it. Empirical evidence 
(Davis, 1992) suggests that, while groups are more successful than individuals in these problem-solving tasks, their perfor-
mance rarely meets the theoretical baseline defined by the truth-wins criterion. It is, therefore, reasonable to conjecture 
that, in pure coordination games, groups of two individuals, as the ones we employ in our experiment, have the potential 
to perform better than individuals.
While interpreting pure coordination games as problem-solving tasks seems uncontroversial, doing so for games with 
conflicts of interest requires more words of explanation. Games with conflicts of interest are coordination games in which 
players have conflicting preferences among equilibria. A typical example of such games is the Battle of the Sexes. Schelling 
argues that, when interests diverge, parties should simply choose following payoff-irrelevant cues and reconcile their inter-
ests:
“Beggars cannot be choosers about the source of their signal or about its attractiveness compared with others that 
they can only wish were as conspicuous. [. . . ] The conflict gets reconciled - or perhaps we should say ignored - as a 
by-product of the dominant need for coordination.” (Schelling, 1957, pp. 22, 27).
From this quote, it is clear that the dominant need for coordination is more important than the conflict of interest. If 
‘beggars’ want to coordinate, they should just ignore the conflict and follow the ‘signal’. This signal then provides a way 
to solve the coordination problem and to reconcile the conflict. So, these games, as pure coordination games, are seen by 
Schelling as games that have a solution.
Contrary to Schelling’s expectations, and possibly his interpretation, recent experimental evidence (e.g. Crawford et al., 
2008; Isoni et al., 2013; Parravano and Poulsen, 2015) has shown that when conflicts of interest are introduced, payoff-
irrelevant cues lose much of their power as coordination devices. One possible explanation is that the need for coordination 
is dominated by the conflict of interest. However, we argue that, when the conflict is negligible, this evidence is not nec-
essarily at odds with Schelling’s analysis. In the experiments of Crawford et al. and Isoni et al., subjects frequently chose 
1 Some authors (Bardsley et al., 2010; Mehta et al., 1994) assume that labels are players’ common knowledge, while some others assume they are player’s 
private descriptions (Sugden, 1995).
2 Conjunctive tasks are those where the group productivity is that of the least productive member (e.g. a group climbing a mountain). Additive tasks are 
those where the contributions of the members are added up or averaged to form the group’s contribution (e.g. relay race); in discretionary tasks group 
members may combine their efforts in any way they like (e.g. musical band).
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We conjecture that subjects were distracted by the payoffs but still wanted to coordinate, even if this meant choosing the 
option with the lower payoff. We can think therefore of these games as trade-off games (Bacharach, 1993; Bacharach and 
Bernasconi, 1997). Trade-off games are pure coordination games characterised by the presence of two distinct families of 
attributes that players use to describe the game to themselves (Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997). For each family there ex-
ists a set of labels with one label for each attribute.3 One family is highly ‘available’ to players (it comes easily to mind) but 
contains more than one salient label. The other family is ‘obscure’ (it does not come easily to mind) but contains a unique 
label.4 An example of a trade-off game is given by Bacharach (1993). Two players must make a secret mark on a wooden 
block out of a set of 20. If they both mark the same block they earn some amount of money. Otherwise they earn nothing. 
Two blocks are red and 18 are yellow. At closer inspection, the wood grain in one of the yellow blocks is wavy, while in all 
the others it is straight. The colour of the blocks is the obvious family with non-unique labels (two red labels and 18 yellow 
labels), and the wood grain is the obscure family with a unique label (wavy grain). A player should mark the wavy-grained 
block only if she believes that the probability, that the other player has noticed it, is high enough. Trade-off games can then 
be considered as problem-solving tasks with a non-obvious solution. With divergent interests, players’ payoffs become more 
salient (we can think of them as the obvious family) than when the conflict of interest is absent, and their saliency has 
the effect of obfuscating that of the payoff-irrelevant cues (we can think of payoff-irrelevant cues as the obscure family). As 
for pure coordination games, we expect groups to be more successful than individuals at finding the solution not only in 
trade-off games, but also in coordination games with small conflicts of interest.
Blume and Gneezy (2010) provide experimental evidence using a disc game with the characteristics of a trade-off game. 
In this game, players are presented with a two-sided five-sector disc with two black sectors and three white ones. The 
circular arrangement of the sectors is such that a white sector is always between the two black ones.5 The two black sectors 
are prominent, in that there are only two of them compared to the three white ones while the white sector, in between 
the two black ones, is unique but not prominent (distinct sector henceforth). Results show that coordination success in this 
game is lowered by the difficulty of identification of the distinct sector, but it is higher than that implied by random choices.
Our interpretation of games with a low degree of conflict as trade-off games does not seem applicable when the conflict 
is large. Crawford et al. (2008) and Isoni et al. (2013) find that, in these instances subjects overwhelmingly chose the 
strategy where they could get, in the case of successful coordination, the higher payoff for themselves. This pattern cannot 
be explained by claiming that it is just the saliency of the payoff-irrelevant cues that changes. The need for coordination 
seems to be affected as well. This is not to say that subjects do not want to coordinate, they do want to, but on their 
preferred equilibrium. How groups are expected to perform in these games is not clear. Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) find 
that in ultimatum games, groups are more rational under the assumption of own profit maximisation than individuals, 
in that they propose and accept lower offers; similar conclusions are offered by Bornstein et al. (2004) who find that, in 
the centipede game, groups exit the game earlier than individuals. Cox and Hayne (2006) find instead the opposite result 
in common value auctions. Kocher and Sutter (2005) find that groups are not more rational than individuals in a beauty 
context game but learn faster. Cooper and Kagel (2005) compare group and individual behaviour in a signalling game. 
Groups outperform both individuals and the demanding truth-wins criterion, against which their performance is evaluated. 
Although evidence on group behaviour is mixed, Kugler et al. (2012) conclude that, in strategic settings, groups behave more 
in line with game theoretical predictions under the assumptions of rationality and selfishness than individuals.
In strategic interactions, groups are generally found to be more competitive (or non-cooperative) than individuals. This 
behaviour, termed the discontinuity effect, has been demonstrated in a series of studies involving the prisoner’s dilemma 
game, where groups more often choose the non-cooperative strategy (for a review see Wildschut et al., 2003). Selfishness 
(greed) and fear of defection (Insko et al., 1990) are the leading explanations for this behaviour.6 Competition can also have 
beneficial effects on group performance. Bornstein et al. (2002) show that group coordination in the weakest-link game 
(Van Huyck et al., 1990) increases when competition between groups is introduced. However, groups can achieve higher 
coordination success, even without competition. Feri et al. (2010) compare group and individual behaviour in a range of 
coordination games. In games with Pareto-ranked equilibria, groups, contrary to individuals, select more often more efficient 
equilibria, earning on average higher profits. In games in which equilibria are not Pareto-ranked, they observe no difference 
between groups and individuals. Additionally, groups avoid miscoordination more successfully than individuals, but this only 
holds for large groups (i.e. five members) and when the number of strategies available to players is greater than two.
3 Note that labels in these games are not common knowledge, but are players’ private descriptions. In addition, Bacharach and Bernasconi do not use the 
term ‘label’ but ‘attribute’.
4 If a label is either prominent but not unique or unique but not prominent, according to the notion of salience in Lewis (1969), it fails to be salient. 
In fact, a label is defined as salient if it is both unique and prominent. Bacharach, however, argues that, if we interpret the concept of salience as one of 
degrees, then that label is salient.
5 Blume and Gneezy (2010) also employ in their experiment another disc game where the two black sectors are next to each other as are the three 
white sectors.
6 Groups might choose the non-cooperative outcome that would result in a higher payoff for themselves if the other group chooses to cooperate (self-
ishness). However, they might also choose the non-cooperative outcome if they anticipate that the other group will choose it (fear of defection). Halevy et 
al. (2008, 2012) employ a modified inter-group prisoner’s dilemma game (Bornstein, 1992, 2003) to distinguish between situations in which competition is 
driven by a desire to hurt the out-group from those in which competition is motivated by the desire to help the in-group. They find that groups are not 
competitive per se but enter a competition in the attempt to maximise the group gains.
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What emerges from this review is that groups are more competitive than individuals, and their behaviour is closer to 
rationality under the assumption of selfishness. In some cases, this can be beneficial for group performance (e.g. coordination 
games). However in others, it can be detrimental (e.g. prisoner’s dilemma games). If we were to apply these conclusions to 
the games of concern, we should expect groups, when conflicts of interest are non-trivial, to coordinate less successfully on 
the focal point and to choose more often the strategy that, in case of successful coordination, guarantees the higher payoff 
for themselves.
In this paper, we explore group behaviour using three different games: the pie game (Crawford et al.); the bargaining 
table (Isoni et al.); and the disc game (Blume and Gneezy). The bargaining table and the pie game have been implemented 
with and without conflicts of interest, while the disc game, being a trade-off game, has only been implemented with no 
conflict of interest to avoid adding any further complexity to the already complex game.
Our main findings are as follows. In pure coordination games, where conflict is absent, groups’ choices agree more often 
with the choice suggested by the payoff-irrelevant cues. When conflicts of interest are introduced, groups do better than 
individuals only in the pie game when the size of the conflict is small. If we restrict our attention to groups and individuals 
that choose the distinct sector in the disc game, we find that they tend to coordinate more often on the focal point in both 
the pie game and the bargaining table, but only when the degree of conflict is small. This suggests that the ability to see 
the solution when interests are divergent is correlated with the cognitive sophistication needed to notice the inconspicuous 
but unique distinct sector.
Our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design; section 3 is devoted to predictions; 
section 4 presents the results; and section 5 presents the conclusions.
2. Experimental design
In our experiment, we employed three two-player coordination games: pie game (Crawford et al.), bargaining table (Isoni 
et al.), and disc game (Blume and Gneezy).
The pie game. In this game, players are presented with a pie (Fig. 1a) with three slices of equal size: a red slice, that 
we will denote as Rab , and two white slices that we will denote as Wab and Wba . The first subscript represents one 
player’s payoff, and the second subscript represents the other player’s payoff. Players have to choose one of the three slices 
simultaneously and without communication. If they choose the same slice, one earns the amount at the left of the comma 
while the other earns the amount on the right.7 Colour is the payoff-irrelevant cue of the game and red is the salient label. 
To avoid creating other payoff-irrelevant cues, such as position, the rotation of the pie was randomised across players.
We implemented five payoff pairs (Table 1) drawn from a value set {a,b}, in which a ≥ b (these payoffs represent 
monetary amounts in pounds). Payoffs M1 implement the pie game with no conflict of interest with a = b. Payoffs M2 −M5
introduce conflicts of interest where a > b. The payoffs on Rab are always the same as the payoffs on the Wab while the 
payoffs on the Wba are always reversed.
In determining the payoff pairs we followed the literature. Payoff pairs M1, M2 and M3 were used by Crawford et al. 
(2008) who showed that even a small difference in payoffs such as the one in M2 had a detrimental impact on coordination 
success. In addition to payoffs M1 and M3, Isoni et al. (2013) implemented M4 and M5 with the purpose of investigating 
7 The payoffs shown on each slice were either (£a, £b) or (£b, £a). From each participant’s perspective, the amount of money she could earn was always 
displayed on the left side of the comma, and the amount the other player could earn was always on the right. In other words, the order of £a and £b on 
the same slice was different between players.
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Payoffs used in the pie game and the bargain-
ing table.
Payoffs a b
M1 5 5
M2 5.1 5
M3 6 5
M4 8 3
M5 10 1
whether increasing the difference in payoffs, while keeping the sum of payoffs constant with the exception of M1, would 
affect coordination.
The bargaining table. In the bargaining table, two players are presented with a 9 × 9 square grid with two coloured bases 
(red and blue) and two discs. Players are randomly assigned to one of the bases, and they select simultaneously and without 
communication only one of the two discs (we will say they claim a disc). If they claim the same disc, they earn nothing. If 
they claim different discs, they earn a positive payoff shown on the disc itself (see Fig. 1b for a graphical representation of 
the bargaining table). The bases were always placed in row 5 and column 2 and 8, respectively (column and row numbers 
were not shown to subjects). The colour of the bases was randomised, so that the blue base was sometimes on the left 
of the table and sometimes on the right. The two discs were always placed in row 3, column 2 and in row 7, column 8, 
respectively, so that each disc was relatively close to one of the bases. In bargaining tables, closeness is the payoff-irrelevant 
cue, that has been shown to be a powerful coordination device (e.g. Isoni et al., 2013), and the close disc is the salient label. 
The payoffs we employed in this game are the same as the ones employed in the pie game.
The disc game. The disc game is the only trade-off game in our experiment. In this game, a pair of players is presented 
with a two-sided disc with two black sectors and three white ones. The graphical representation of the disc is shown in 
Fig. 1c. The side and the rotation of the disc are randomised across players. Players have to choose simultaneously and 
without communication one of the sectors. If they both choose the same sector, they earn a positive amount; otherwise, 
they earn nothing. With such a complex game, we decided to implement only payoffs M1 and not to display the monetary 
amounts on the sectors, as this was deemed not necessary. Given that subjects could be presented with either side of the 
disc and any rotation, the only sector that could be uniquely identified was the white sector between the two black ones 
(i.e. the distinct sector).
Our experiment involves two treatments, an individual treatment (Ind) and a group treatment (Group) implemented 
between subjects. The main difference between the two treatments is that in the Ind treatment players are individuals, 
while in the Group treatment players are groups of two individuals.
The Ind treatment. The Ind treatment is our baseline treatment. Each subject was randomly and anonymously paired with 
another subject in the room and played the 11 coordination games in random order. No communication was allowed during 
the experiment, and no feedback was given until the end.
The Group treatment. In the Group treatment players are groups of two individuals. At the beginning of each session, 
every participant was informed that she would be randomly paired with another participant in the room to form a group, 
and that this person would be the same for the duration of the experiment. It was common knowledge that players were 
groups of two individuals.
A group-decision was reached only when both members agreed on the same option. The process of reaching a group 
decision was the following. First, each group member privately suggested what the group should choose.8 Once both mem-
bers gave their suggestions, they could see the options they had suggested on their screen. At this stage, they were allowed 
to communicate via a chat box to concert their choices. Groups could chat for as long as they wished and there was no 
limit to the number of words that they could exchange. The only rule we implemented was that, even if both suggestions 
coincided, team-mates were asked to chat so to make sure that their choices were not the result of an unintended mistake 
made in the suggestion phase. Subjects were not explicitly told that this was the reason. Once a group agreed unanimously 
on which option to choose, each group member selected on their respective screen the option they had agreed on; a second 
screen would then show a message confirming that their choices coincided, and the group could then proceed to the next 
game. If, for any reason, after the chat stage, choices did not coincide, the group had the chance to chat again to revise their 
choices. This process could be repeated five times. If no agreement was reached by then, the computer would randomly 
choose on their behalf.9
Groups, as well as individuals, were given no feedback until the end of the experiment, so until then they only knew 
what their choices were but not what other groups (or individuals) had chosen.
8 In the instructions, it was made clear that the rotation of both the disc and the pie was kept the same for members of the same group but was 
randomised across groups. In the Ind treatment, participants were told that the rotation of both the pie and the disc was randomised across participants.
9 In the actual experiment, all groups reached a final decision. In fact, only few groups needed more than one chat session to reach a unanimous decision. 
In the few cases where two chat sessions were needed, it was because one of the group members changed her mind at the last minute.
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same as the corresponding earnings in the Ind treatment. For example, if two groups coordinated successfully on a game 
with no conflict of interest, each group member would earn £5.
We ran the experiment at the University of East Anglia in February 2016. We recruited 148 subjects (48 subjects in 
the Ind treatment and 50 groups of two individuals each in the Group treatment) with the online recruiting system hRoot 
(Bock et al., 2014). Most subjects were British (51.35%) and the second most frequent nationality was Chinese (14.86%). 
The average age was approximately 21, and 60.81% of the subjects were females. The experimental sessions in the Group 
treatment lasted on average 80 minutes while those in the Ind treatment lasted for 40 minutes. At the beginning of each 
experimental session, subjects were asked to read the instructions and to answer a brief questionnaire to make sure that 
instructions were correctly understood. Once all clarification questions were answered, the experiment started. At the end 
of the experiment, one of the games was randomly chosen, and subjects were paid the amount they had earned in that 
game. Average earnings were £3.08. Subject were given an additional participation fee of £5.
3. Predictions
In this section, we will derive some hypotheses that will be used as benchmarks to compare the behaviour of groups 
versus the behaviour of individuals.
To derive predictions in the Ind treatment, we will use the theory of team reasoning to draw hypotheses for the pie game 
and the bargaining table, and variable frame theory (VFT, Bacharach, 1993; Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997) for the trade-off 
game (i.e. disc game). Both theories are consistent with Schelling’s view of coordination games as problems with a solution, 
hence they seem to be the most natural choices. Although we could employ team reasoning to derive predictions in the disc 
game, VFT is the best-suited theory, as it has been developed by Bacharach to explain behaviour in tacit coordination games 
including those where cognition might play a role. Cognitive hierarchic theory (Camerer et al., 2004) and level-k models 
(e.g. Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001) are also often used to explain behaviour in coordination 
games. These models assume that players differ in their level of cognitive sophistication. In order to apply level-k models to 
coordination games with payoff-irrelevant cues, Crawford et al. (2008) assume that level-0 players choose non-strategically, 
and higher levels best respond to players that are one level below theirs. Although these models can be used to derive 
predictions in the games we employ in this experiment, assumptions regarding the distribution of levels in the population, 
as well as how levels combine to form a group level, need to be introduced. The predictions so derived are, however, 
sensitive to these auxiliary assumptions, hence we will just employ team reasoning and VFT.10
To derive predictions for the Group treatment, we first need to derive predictions for the behaviour of each individual 
group member. Then we need a decision rule for the group that will allow us to derive group behaviour from that of its 
members. Because group members do not interact when they first make a suggestion to the other member, we will use 
team reasoning and VFT as with Ind treatment. In fact, the same predictions apply to both individuals and group members. 
As a decision rule, given the interpretation of coordination games with focal points as problem-solving tasks, we will use 
the truth-wins criterion. The truth-wins criterion, used for highly demonstrable tasks (Davis, 1992), assumes that group 
members work independently on a problem and that the group will select the correct answer if at least one of its members 
proposes it.
3.1. Pie game and bargaining table
Although some versions of team reasoning are different in respect of whether individuals aim to maximise team’s utility 
(Bacharach, 2006; Sugden, 1993, 1995) or achieve mutual benefits (Sugden, 2018), their core is very similar. The theory of 
team reasoning posits that individuals will make choices based on team thinking, that is, instead of asking ‘what should 
I do?’ they ask ‘what should we do?’. They first try to find a rule (the best rule - e.g. a strategy profile in a game), if 
such exists, that either maximises the team’s utility or yields mutual benefits. Each individual then follows that rule in the 
expectation that others will do the same. In two-player pure coordination games, such a rule is for both players to choose 
the strategy suggested by the payoff-irrelevant cues. When conflicts of interest are introduced, team-reasoning predictions 
do not change.
Team reasoning theories were developed as an attempt to formalise Schelling’s theory of focal points, and in common 
with Schelling’s theory, they do seem to consider coordination games as problems that have a correct solution (i.e. the best 
rule), that is, problem-solving tasks. Evidence in social psychology shows that groups do better than individuals in this type 
of task (Laughlin et al., 2006). Lorge and Solomon (1955) were the first ones to use as a theoretical benchmark, the so-called 
truth-wins criterion, to evaluate the superior performance of groups versus that of individuals. The criterion assumes that 
group interactions are neutral, so that the group should be able to correctly solve the problem if at least one member solves 
it. If the probability of an individual to solve the problem is equal to p then a group with n randomly selected members 
should be able to solve the same problem with a probability of q = 1 − (1 − p)n . Given that in our experiment n = 2, the 
probability of a group finding the best rule is q = 1 − (1 − p)2 > p.
10 See Appendix B for more details about the limitations of level-k predictions.
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than individuals.
H2: When interests are not aligned, in both pie game and bargaining table, groups will choose the red slice and the close disc more 
often than individuals.
3.2. Disc game
A central concept of VFT is that of frame. In coordination games, players are usually required to choose one out of a set 
of n objects. These objects are characterised by some attributes. A frame is defined as a set of families of attributes which 
can be used to partition the objects or options into subsets. In the disc game, we can identify two families of attributes: the 
colour family (C ) and the circular order of the sectors (O ). There are therefore four possible frames associated with these 
families of attributes: the empty frame {∅}, the colour frame {C}, the circular order frame {O }, and the conjunction of the 
last two frames {C, O }. Only the last frame is complete while the others are subsets of this.
In VFT, frames determine which options players have available to choose from. If a player has only the colour frame {C}, 
her options are {choose a sector, choose a black sector, choose a white sector}. If a player has the complete frame {C, O } she 
is able to notice, given the circular arrangement of sectors and their colour, that one of them is unique (the distinct white 
sector), her options are then {choose a sector, choose a black sector, choose a white sector, choose the distinct sector}.
Families of attributes can be distinguished depending on their availability. When families come easily to mind, they are 
said to be easily available. We define v as the probability that a player notices (is aware of) a family of attributes. In the 
disc game, colour is an easily available family, so it seems uncontroversial to assume that all players have the colour frame 
{C}, hence v = 1. The fact, that the circular order of the sectors in conjunction with the colour implies that the white sector 
in between the black ones is a unique one, is not easily available, hence v < 1. The probability v , in VFT, is independent 
across players. There will therefore be players that have a complete frame {C, O } and players that only have a subset of it, 
that is, {C}. Players’ beliefs about other players’ frames are correct but limited by their own frame, that is, a player who 
only has the {C} frame cannot have a belief that other players have the complete frame {C, O }, because she does not have 
that frame. Given a frame, players are assumed to choose the option whose attribute is rarer because this guarantees higher 
chances of successful coordination (i.e. rarity preference). In the disc game, if a player has the {C} frame, she will pick one 
of the black sectors, as there are only two of them, while there are three white ones. If a player has a complete frame 
{C, O } she will choose the distinct sector only if she believes that the probability v , that the other player has a complete 
frame, is greater than the probability of coordinating on the black sectors. Given that there are only two black sectors, a 
player with a complete frame will choose the distinct sector only if v > 1/2.
We will now adapt this framework to obtain predictions for the Group treatment. The truth-wins criterion predicts that 
the probability of a group being aware of the distinct sector is v ′ = 1 − (1 − v)2 > v . When players are randomly paired 
into groups, the probability that the distinct sector will be noticed increases, because only one individual in the group is 
needed for the group to notice it, and v is independent across players. Additionally, given that group formation is common 
knowledge, groups’ beliefs, that are assumed to be correct albeit limited by their frame, about the probability that other 
groups will notice the distinct sector, will increase compared to individuals. Assuming for simplicity, that beliefs across 
treatments do not change, according to the truth-wins criterion, if the probability of an individual to choose the distinct 
sector is q, a group will choose the distinct sector with probability q′ = 1 − (1 − q)2 > q.
H3: In the disc game, groups will choose the distinct sector more often than individuals.
4. Results
4.1. Overview
Fig. 2 and Table 2 report the proportion of times the salient option (the term salient option will be used to indicate the 
red slice for the pie game, the close disc for the bargaining table, and the distinct sector for the disc game) is chosen by 
treatment, game type and payoff type. In all games and for all payoffs, except M5 for the bargaining table (BT), groups 
choose the salient option more often than individuals. In both treatments, these proportions decrease as the difference in 
payoffs increases (M1 − M5). Similarly, the difference between treatments becomes less sharp.
Table 3 presents the same summary statistics as Fig. 2 but with a greater level of detail. The table is split into three 
panels. Panel a reports summary results for the pie game, Panel b for the bargaining table and Panel c for the disc game. 
For each game, we report the distribution of choices over options (i.e. slices, discs, and sectors).
The slices in the pie game are Rab (the red slice with payoffs (a,b)), Wba (the white slice with payoffs (b,a)) and Wab
(the white slice with payoffs as (a,b), the same as Rab). The sectors in the disc game are labelled D for the distinct sector, 
B1 and B2 for the two black sectors and W 1 and W 2 for the two white adjacent sectors. For the bargaining table we only 
report proportions of close disc choices, that is, the disc near a player’s base.
For the pie game and the bargaining table, we report choices broken down by payoff type and also player type for games 
with conflicts of interest (payoffs M2 − M5). We define as Player 1 (P1) the player whose payoff is greater in the salient 
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Table 2
Frequency of salient option choices in all games by treatment and payoff type.
Game Salient option Treatment M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
(5,5) (5.1,5) (6,5) (8,3) (10,1)
Disc game Distinct sector (D) Ind 0.35 – – – –
Group 0.58 – – – –
Bargaining table Close disc (C) Ind 0.85 0.75 0.69 0.67 0.63
Group 0.94 0.82 0.72 0.68 0.56
Pie game Red slice (Rab) Ind 0.83 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.44
Group 0.98 0.74 0.72 0.64 0.54
option and Player 2 (P2) the player whose payoff is instead lower. Finally, for each payoff pair we report the expected 
coordination rates (EC R), and the significance level of their difference between treatments.
Note that using the actual coordination rates obtained from our experimental data has no special significance. In our 
experiment, players (individuals or groups) were randomly paired at the beginning of the experiment.11 This means that 
only one pairing out of many possible ones was actually implemented. However, because each player could, in principle, be 
matched with every other player that took part in the experiment, it is more meaningful to use the EC R that measures the 
probability that, in a game, two randomly matched players choose the same option.
In pure coordination games, the EC Rs are obtained using the following formula (Mehta et al., 1994):
EC R =
∑
i
EC Ri =
∑
i
ni (ni − 1)
N (N − 1)
where N is the number of players (individuals or groups, depending on the treatment), i is the slice, disc, or sector for 
which we are calculating the EC R , and ni is the number of players that have chosen that slice, disc, or sector. The EC Ri are 
then added up to obtain total EC R for a particular game.
In coordination games with payoff pairs M2 − M5, the EC Ri is obtained in each game by multiplying the proportion of 
P1s that choose option i times the proportion of P2s that choose the same option. The EC Ri are then added up.
The EC R differs from the coordination success predicted by the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The former is derived 
from subjects’ actual behaviour, whereas the latter is a theoretical benchmark. For example, in the disc game, the mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium in which players uniformly randomise across strategies, predicts a coordination success of 1/5.
Given that each EC R consists of only one observation, to test whether there is a treatment effect, we use the bootstrap 
procedure employed by Bardsley et al. (2010). We repeatedly sample with replacement 10,000 times the distribution of 
choices for each payoff pair and game type in the Ind treatment. For each of these distributions, we calculate the corre-
sponding EC R as explained above. We then use this distribution to obtain confidence intervals for the Group treatment.
11 Note that this is not relevant for the subjects given they were only given feedback on a randomly selected game at the end of the experiment.
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Frequency of choices in all games by treatment and payoff type.
Panel a - Pie game
Treatment Slice Player M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
(5,5) (5.1,5) (6,5) (8,3) (10,1)
Ind Rab P1 0.83 0.50 0.63 0.63 0.54
P2 0.67 0.58 0.50 0.33
Wba P1 0.06 0.46 0.33 0.29 0.21
P2 0.04 0.21 0.33 0.67
Wab P1 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.25
P2 0.29 0.21 0.17 0.00
Group Rab P1 0.98 0.72 0.80 0.84 0.80
P2 0.76 0.64 0.44 0.28
Wba P1 0.00 0.24 0.08 0.16 0.12
P2 0.24 0.36 0.56 0.64
Wab P1 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.08
P2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
Expected coordination rates
Ind 0.70 0.36 0.44 0.42 0.32
Group 0.96 0.60 0.54 0.46 0.31
S *** *** *
Panel b - Bargaining table
Treatment Player M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
(5,5) (5.1,5) (6,5) (8,3) (10,1)
Ind P1 0.85 0.75 0.58 0.58 0.79
P2 0.75 0.79 0.75 0.46
Group P1 0.94 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.88
P2 0.92 0.72 0.60 0.24
Expected coordination rates
Ind 0.73 0.63 0.55 0.54 0.48
Group 0.88 0.68 0.60 0.55 0.30
S ** ***
Panel c - Disc game
Treatment D B1 B2 W1 W2 Total
Ind 0.35 0.21 0.31 0.08 0.04 1.00
Group 0.58 0.22 0.16 0.02 0.02 1.00
Expected coordination rates
Ind 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.26
Group 0.33 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.40
S *** ***
Notes: In the bargaining table, we only report the frequency of choices for the close disc. Significance levels (S): *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and 
***p < 0.01.
4.2. The pie game and the bargaining table
Games with no conflicts of interest. In games with no conflicts of interest (payoffs M1) groups choose the salient option 
more often than individuals. In the pie game, 98% of groups choose the red slice compared to 83% of individuals (test of 
proportions, p < 0.01); in the bargaining table, 94% of groups choose the close disc compared to 85% of individuals (test 
of proportions, p < 0.09). Binomial test results reveal that these proportions are significantly greater than those entailed 
by random choices (p < 0.01 in both cases). The EC Rs are shown at the bottom of Panel a and Panel b in Table 3. They 
are extremely high in both treatments but exceptionally high in the Group treatment (96% in the pie game and 88% in the 
bargaining table). The difference in EC Rs between treatments is significant (bootstrap procedure, p < 0.001 and p < 0.05
for the pie game and the bargaining table, respectively). This result is consistent with H1.
R1: In the pie game and the bargaining table, groups coordinate more often than individuals on the focal point when there is no 
conflict of interest.
Games with conflicts of interest. When conflicts of interest are introduced, the pattern in the data is more complex. In the 
pie game, see Table 2, we observe that the Rab slice is chosen on average less frequently in both treatments as the payoff 
difference increases. The most notable difference between treatments is that groups (see Table 3) choose significantly less 
often than individuals the Wab slice (Chi2 test, p < 0.001) and as a consequence, they concentrate their choices more on 
the two remaining slices Rab and Wba . This result seems to suggest that groups do indeed perceive focality more strongly 
than individuals, thus allowing them to exclude from their choices slice Wab and to achieve greater EC Rs than individuals 
for payoffs M2 and M3 (see Table 3). When the payoff difference increases, EC Rs not surprisingly drop in both treatments.
In the bargaining table, both groups and individuals choose less often the salient option as the payoff difference increases. 
Groups tend to choose the close disc more often than individuals (except for payoffs M5) but the difference is small and 
not significant for any payoff pair we employ. EC Rs decrease as payoff difference increases and, unlike in the pie game, 
there are no differences across treatments (the only exception is M5, where groups perform worse than individuals). Given 
that in this game there are only two options from which to choose (unlike in the pie game where there are three options), 
groups’ stronger sensitivity to focality, observed in the pie game, is of no help. This result does not provide full support to 
H2.
R2: Although groups seem to perceive saliency more strongly than individuals, this is not enough to fully support H2.
4.3. Disc game
The disc game is a trade-off game (Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997) in that the identification of the unique distinct sector 
requires some level of cognitive sophistication. In line with H3, groups choose the distinct sector (58%) more often than 
individuals (35%). This difference is significant at a 5% level (test of proportions). Individuals (52%) choose the black sectors 
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both groups and individuals. In the bootstrapped results for the D sector, only eight observations out of 10,000 (p < 0.001) 
are greater than the observed EC RD in the Group treatment. As a consequence, the difference in total EC R between groups 
and individuals is strongly significant as well (see Table 3, Panel c).
R3a: In line with H3, groups choose significantly more often than individuals the distinct sector in the disc game, and this leads to 
a greater ECR in the Group treatment than that in the Ind treatment.
To understand what is driving this result, we have looked at the decisions each group member made before having the 
chance to chat with their own partner. Before chatting, the proportion of group members that chose the distinct sector was 
42%, a bit greater than that in the Ind treatment but not significantly different (test of proportion, p = 0.85). This shows that 
at the individual level, choices in the two treatments are similar. In only 14 cases, group members chose the same sector 
before chatting and, in 11 of these cases, they chose the distinct sector. All these groups confirmed their initial choices 
after chatting. Of the 36 groups whose members disagreed on their initial choices, 20 had one member who suggested the 
distinct sector before communication. In 17 of these cases, the group finally agreed on choosing the distinct sector, and only 
in three cases did the group opt for one of the black sectors. From the analysis of the chats we found evidence that 12 
of these 17 groups chose the distinct sector because of its uniqueness. In the other five cases, the analysis of the chats is 
inconclusive. Finally, the groups that disagreed on sectors other than the distinct one reached a common decision because 
one of the members changed her suggestion to match the choice of the other member. In these cases, the chat analysis is 
inconclusive. But this is not surprising, as both black sectors and the two adjacent white ones are not unique, no argument 
can be provided for favouring one over the other. Just in a few cases, groups referred to the black sectors as being the right 
choice, or that coordination in that game was just random. This result provides support to the interpretation of coordination 
games as problems with a solution. If one of the members notices the uniqueness of the distinct sector, the other member 
is persuaded that choosing that sector is the correct choice. The chat analysis also shows that beliefs, about whether the 
other player has noticed the distinct sector do not seem to play a crucial role. Once one of the group members finds the 
solution the group will adopt it as such.
R3b: If one of the group members is aware of the distinct sector, the group is more likely to choose the distinct sector.
4.4. Group performance and truth-wins criterion
Fig. 3 directly compares the proportion of salient option choices in the Group treatment with simulated truth-wins 
predictions. These predictions are indicated by the symbol ‘×’, and error bars for the 90% confidence intervals are also 
reported. The truth-wins predictions are obtained using a procedure similar to the one employed by Cooper and Kagel 
(2005).12
In pure coordination games (payoffs M1), groups choose the salient option as often as the truth-wins criterion predicts. 
This is consistent with H1 and the results presented in the previous sections. In the pie game, for payoffs M2 − M5, the 
proportions of salient option choices are below the 90% confidence intervals for the truth-wins predictions. This distance is 
even more pronounced in the bargaining table.
R4: In games with no conflicts of interest, groups choose the salient option at least as often as predicted by the truth-wins criterion, 
but they choose it less often in games with conflicts of interest.
Our results, in games with conflicts of interest, are consistent with abundant evidence in social psychology (see Davis, 
1992, for a review) that shows that, although groups are more successful than individuals at solving problems with a highly 
demonstrable solution, their performance is generally lower than that set by the truth-wins criterion. The lower performance 
of groups can be explained by some inefficiencies in the group decision process (e.g. reduced motivation of group members 
compared to individuals, inefficiencies in combining individual responses into a group one, etc.).13
12 Because we compare proportions of salient option choices, we need simulations to calculate error bars correctly. We have simulated 10,000 group 
datasets for each game and payoffs employed. Simulated groups are obtained from the individual treatment by repeatedly sampling with replacement 
a pair of distributions in the individual treatment. The two distributions are then combined to calculate the truth-wins predictions. A simulated group 
is considered as having chosen the salient option if either of its members choose the salient option. For payoffs M2 − M5, the pair of distributions are 
obtained separately for P1 and P2.
13 It is possible that the lower performance of groups relates to the size of incentives. The experimental sessions in the Group treatment were twice as 
long as those in the Ind treatment, but payments were the same. If groups perceived incentives as being too low, the observed difference in behaviour 
between groups and individuals might be underestimated. We needed payments to be consistent between treatments, but we do recognise that they were 
probably quite small. However, Parravano and Poulsen (2015) find that the size of payoffs does not affect coordination behaviour in games with focal points 
when interests diverge.
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Table 4
Panel a - Length of the chats in the Group treatment as a measure of demonstrability. Panel b -
Regression analysis.
Panel a - Length of chats
Game Payoffs Words Time N
Disc M1 45 120 17
Pie & BT M1 28 89 9
Pie & BT M2 & M3 44 108 27
Pie & BT M4 & M5 54 138 31
Panel b - Regression analysis
Model 1 Model 2
– – – –
−17.92∗ (9.74) −30.36 (23.85)
−1.58 (8.66) −12.00 (21.30)
8.85 (8.36) 17.97 (20.99)
Notes: Panel a - The column ‘Words’ reports the average number of words used in the chats by the 
groups in which there is an initial disagreement, and one of the members has selected the salient 
option. The column ‘Time’ reports the average time in seconds that groups spent in the chats. The 
column ‘N’ reports the number of observations, which corresponds to the number of groups. Panel b
reports the results of two OLS regressions, clustering at the group level, with the average number of 
words (Model 1) and average time spent in the chat (Model 2) as dependent variables. Significance 
levels (S): *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
Inefficiencies in the group decision process might relate to the demonstrability of the solution to a task. If a solution is 
not highly demonstrable,14 the group might not recognise it if one of the members suggests it, or members might disagree 
altogether on what the solution is. The length of the chats in our experiment could be used as an indication of how 
demonstrable a solution is in all the games and payoffs employed. Intuitively, if the solution to the coordination problem 
is highly demonstrable, the group should adopt it as an answer without the need for a lengthy discussion. If instead the 
solution is not highly demonstrable, the group might need to chat for longer in order to adopt it as a group response. The 
length of the chats can be measured not only in terms of time spent in the chat but also in terms of words exchanged. Both 
measures present advantages and disadvantages. For example, time does not only reflect the number of words typed but 
also how fast one can type. Similarly, the number of words used might correlate with written communication skills.
Panel a in Table 4 reports both the average number of words exchanged by groups and the time needed to exchange 
them, when members’ initial suggestions differ. Because of the small number of observations (in particular for the pie game 
and the bargaining table in games with no conflict of interests) we have pooled observations across similar games: we 
report the disc game separately as its solution is not as obvious as it is in the other two games, we pool the observations 
for the pie game and the bargaining table in games with no conflicts of interest (payoffs M1), in games with small conflicts 
14 To remind the reader, for a problem to be demonstrable, four conditions need to be satisfied: group agreement on the conceptual system used to solve 
the problem; sufficient information for a solution to exist; sufficient knowledge of the system that allows the group to recognise the solution once it is 
found; sufficient motivation, ability and time for the member that has found the solution to demonstrate the correct solution to the other group members.
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analysis, we have considered only the chats of those groups in which one member has selected the salient option that 
eventually the group chooses.15
The average number of words exchanged in the disc game is almost twice as large as that in the pie game and the 
bargaining table with payoffs M1. Groups exchange as many words in the disc game as they do in the pie game and 
bargaining table with payoffs M2 and M3 but fewer when payoffs are M4 and M5. We observe a similar pattern for the 
time spent in the chat. To test whether differences across games are significant, we have run two OLS regression models 
with clustering at a group level (Table 4, Panel b). The independent variables, reported in the first column of Panel a, are 
four dummy variables: the disc game, the pie game and bargaining table with payoffs M1, payoffs M2 and M3, and payoffs 
M4 and M5 respectively. The dependent variables are the number of words exchanged by the groups (Model 1) and length 
of the chats in seconds (Model 2). The disc game dummy is the baseline case.16 In Model 1, the results indicate that the 
number of words used in the disc game is significantly greater than those exchanged in the pie game and bargaining table 
with no conflicts of interest (M1). In Model 2 no estimated coefficient is statistically significant.
If the number of words exchanged is a proxy for how demonstrable a solution is, these results suggest (although we 
need to be careful about drawing conclusions with such a small sample) that, demonstrability in the disc game is lower 
than that in the pie game and the bargaining table for payoffs M1 but does not significantly differ from that in the pie game 
and bargaining table for payoffs M2, M3, M4 and M5. At odds with this however, we have found that group performance in 
the disc game is as predicted by the truth-wins criterion, implying that the disc game has a highly demonstrable solution, 
unlike games with mild conflicts of interest (payoffs M2 and M3), where group performance is lower. A possible explanation 
for this contradicting results might lie in the fact that the non-obvious solution in the disc game, despite being highly 
demonstrable, is not easily explained and therefore, requires the group to exchange more words to see it.
4.5. Analysis by type
In this section, we ask whether the cognitive sophistication needed for identifying the distinct sector in the disc game 
is correlated with salient option choices in the pie game and the bargaining table. The intuition is that groups and individ-
uals that choose the distinct sector (D-type) appear to possess the necessary cognitive sophistication to solve coordination 
problems that might therefore be transferred to other contexts such as the pie game and the bargaining table. Cognitive 
sophistication can be thought of as a trait that individuals or groups possess and is observed in the disc game that acts as 
a measuring device.
It might be argued that the pie game and the bargaining table feature obvious solutions, hence cognition does not really 
play a role. However, we have contended in the introduction that, despite its saliency, the solution when there is conflict of 
interest, in particular when this is negligible (i.e. M2 and M3), is obfuscated by the payoff difference, hence relatively less 
salient. These games can therefore be interpreted as trade-off games such as the disc game. When the payoff difference is 
large (M4 and M5), both groups and individuals still want to coordinate but on their preferred outcome rather than the 
one suggested by the payoff-irrelevant cues. This seems to be supported by the fact (see Table 3) that an overwhelming 
proportion of both groups and individuals choose the option with the higher payoff for themselves. Hence these games 
cannot be interpreted as trade-off games.
We define as D-type those groups or individuals who have chosen the distinct sector (46 observations) and O-types 
those who have not (52 observations). Fig. 4 and Table 5 present the frequency of salient options in the pie game and the 
bargaining table, broken down by treatment, payoff pair, and type. At the aggregate level, we found strong evidence that 
D-types choose the salient option more often than O-types (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.02).
Mann-Whitney test results also reveal that this proportion is significantly greater for D-groups than both D-individuals 
and O-type individuals and groups (p < 0.09, p < 0.001 and p < 0.04, respectively). Pairwise comparisons between D-
individuals and O-types are not significantly different.
R5: D-groups choose the salient option significantly more often than D-individuals, O-groups, and O-individuals.
Panel c of Table 5 reports the EC Rs per treatment and payoff pair obtained by matching D-players with D-players 
and O-players with O-players. D-type’s EC Rs are, in most cases, greater than those of O-types. In the Ind treatment, the 
difference in EC Rs between types is less pronounced than in the Group treatment but it is almost always significant. In 
15 For this analysis, we have excluded the groups in which neither member suggested the salient option, as we are interested in groups in which one 
member has found the solution and tries to demonstrate it to the other member. The number of excluded groups is very small and the pattern in the data 
is not dissimilar from what is reported in Table 4, Panel a.
16 Note that we can use neither a Mann-Whitney test for independent samples nor a Wilcoxon test for non-independent samples. We have selected the 
groups whose members’ disagreed in their initial suggestion but one of the members chose the salient option. In our sample, some groups satisfy the 
selection criterion in more than one game (so, some observations are non-independent), and some others only in one game (so, some observations are 
independent). It would be possible to solve this problem by either considering only the independent observations or considering only the non-independent 
ones. This would however reduce even further the number of observations. Because of this, we have decided to opt for OLS regressions with clusters at the 
group level).
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Table 5
Frequency of salient option choices and ECRs by game, payoff and player type.
Panel a: Frequency of salient option choices by type
Bargaining game Pie game
Treatment Player Type M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
(5,5) (5.1,5) (6,5) (8,3) (10,1) (5,5) (5.1,5) (6,5) (8,3) (10,1)
Ind P1&P2 O 0.84 0.71 0.65 0.65 0.71 0.81 0.55 0.61 0.52 0.52
D 0.88 0.82 0.76 0.71 0.47 0.88 0.65 0.59 0.65 0.29
Group P1&P2 O 0.95 0.71 0.57 0.67 0.57 0.95 0.57 0.62 0.48 0.52
D 0.93 0.90 0.83 0.69 0.55 1.00 0.86 0.79 0.76 0.55
Panel b: Frequency of salient option choices by type and player type
Bargaining game Pie game
Treatment Player Type M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
(5,5) (5.1,5) (6,5) (8,3) (10,1) (5,5) (5.1,5) (6,5) (8,3) (10,1)
Ind P1 O – 0.75 0.53 0.60 0.93 – 0.40 0.61 0.61 0.59
D – 0.75 0.67 0.56 0.56 – 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.43
P2 O – 0.67 0.75 0.69 0.50 – 0.69 0.62 0.38 0.43
D – 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.38 – 0.63 0.55 0.64 0.20
Group P1 O – 0.54 0.58 0.73 0.85 – 0.50 0.70 0.67 0.75
D – 0.92 0.85 0.80 0.92 – 0.87 0.87 0.94 0.85
P2 O – 1.00 0.56 0.50 0.13 – 0.64 0.55 0.33 0.22
D – 0.88 0.81 0.63 0.29 – 0.86 0.71 0.54 0.31
Panel c: ECRs by type
Bargaining game Pie game
Treatment Player Type M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
(5,5) (5.1,5) (6,5) (8,3) (10,1) (5,5) (5.1,5) (6,5) (8,3) (10,1)
Ind – O 0.73 0.58 0.52 0.54 0.50 0.69 0.28 0.44 0.35 0.32
D 0.79 0.69 0.63 0.54 0.49 0.79 0.47 0.45 0.55 0.43
S * * ** *** *
Group – O 0.91 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.24 0.91 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.29
D 0.87 0.82 0.72 0.58 0.33 1.00 0.76 0.64 0.53 0.32
S ** *** *** ** *
Notes: Significance levels (S): *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
the Group treatment, the difference in EC Rs between types is significant except for payoffs M4 and M5. Interestingly, these 
EC Rs do not significantly differ from the EC Rs obtained in the Ind treatment for games with no conflicts of interest. This 
suggests that, for D-groups, small payoff differences are not an issue and do not lead to coordination failure.
The results in this section lend some support to the hypothesis that games with small payoff differences can be thought 
of as trade-off games. In these games, D-groups, and to a lesser extent D-individuals, are not distracted by small payoff 
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cognition might play a role lies in the fact that D-types might be particularly sensitive to symmetry. That is, to see the 
distinct sector, they should notice that there is an asymmetry and this lies in the distinct sector. In the pie game and the 
bargaining table, Player 1 and Player 2 are in exactly the same position but with opposite interests. A person sensitive to 
symmetry might be able to see, from a purely logical point of view, that whatever applies to Player 1 applies, but in the 
opposite direction, to Player 2. Hence the unique rule that can accommodate this difference is to choose that which is not 
based on payoffs and is the same for both players (i.e. symmetric). This rule is to choose the salient option.
D-groups are more successful in coordination than D-individuals. We postulate that a possible reason might relate to the 
way we measure cognition. Firstly, some participants might have chosen the distinct sector randomly (this might account 
only for a small number of choices). In the Group treatment, however, we have provided evidence that most groups choose 
the distinct sector because of its uniqueness rather than randomly. Secondly, VFT predicts that the belief that other players 
have noticed the distinct sector is smaller in the Ind treatment than in the Group treatment. In the Group treatment, from 
chat analysis, evidence suggests that beliefs did not play a substantial role, however we do not have this evidence in the Ind 
treatment. Thus, it might be possible that the number of participants choosing a black sector, even if aware of the distinct 
one, is greater in the Ind treatment than in the Group treatment. Both these factors together make the D-type/O-type 
distinction in the Ind treatment less precise than in the Group treatment.
5. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to investigate how group behaviour compares to individual behaviour in coordination 
games with focal points. We have argued, consistently with Schelling’s view, that these games can be thought of as games 
with a correct solution and this should lead groups to coordinate more successfully than individuals.
In line with our predictions, we find that groups outperform individuals when interests are aligned and when some level 
of cognitive sophistication is required to identify the solution to the problem of coordination.
When interests are not aligned, and consistent with previous findings (e.g. Crawford et al., 2008; Isoni et al., 2013), the 
expected coordination rates in both treatments drop. Our analysis though suggests that groups seem to be more sensitive to 
salience than individuals, as evidenced by the results in the pie game. This phenomenon is not detectable in the bargaining 
table where the choice is only between two strategies, close disc and far disc. Groups however, in these games, do not 
always perform better than individuals. So, on the one hand, groups seem more sensitive to salience but despite this, their 
coordination success is not higher than that of individuals, except in a few cases. Previous findings on group behaviour show 
that groups are generally more selfish and competitive than individuals, and even more so when the conflicts of interest are 
severe (Wildschut et al., 2003; Kugler et al., 2012). In our experiment, being more competitive could translate into groups 
choosing more often than individuals the option that favours themselves disregarding what payoff-irrelevant cues suggest. 
This could explain, compatibly with our results, why the behaviour of groups in our experiment, for this class of games, 
does not differ significantly from that of individuals, that we conjecture are both less sensitive to salience but also less 
competitive.
Finally, groups and individuals who choose the distinct sector more frequently choose the salient option in the other 
games more often than those who have chosen any other sector. We advanced a conjecture based on cognition. Cognition 
endows players with the ability to identify the perfectly anti-symmetrical position of their co-player compared to theirs and 
to find the rule that applies equally to both of them. This does not necessarily imply maximising the team’s utility function 
but stems mainly from logical considerations arising from the structure of the game. For these groups and individuals, 
uniqueness might be so salient as to overshadow the saliency of the payoffs.
Schelling (1960) believed that finding the key to solve a coordination problem involved more imagination than logic, 
however we have shown that this is only part of the story. Groups and cognitively sophisticated players display a better 
ability to find the solution to the riddle of coordination. This implies that coordination success is not just a matter of 
wanting to coordinate but also being able to do so, and groups have shown a greater ability in this respect.
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Appendix A. Experimental instructions
Note: The instructions for the Ind treatment and the Group are similar. When there are differences, the texts for the Ind treatment 
are enclosed in curly brackets ‘{}’, and the texts for the Group treatment are enclosed in square brackets ‘[]’.
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Welcome to this experiment in [team] decision making. [During the experiment, you will be part of a team made of two 
people - you and another participant.] In each round of the experiment {you} [your team] will be matched with another 
{person} [team (also made of two people)] in the room. Your earnings will depend both on your [team’s] decision and the 
decision of the other {person} [team]. There are 11 rounds (displayed in a random order) and the decisions you have to 
make depend on the type of task in that round. There are three types of task in the experiment.
TASK A
In this type of task, {you} [your team] and the other {person} [team] will be asked to choose one of the five slices of a 
pie, like the one shown below, by clicking on your choice. The pie is two-sided. The computer will flip and spin the pie so 
that [although] the side and rotation you see [will be the same as what your team-mate sees, they] may not be the same 
as the ones the other {person} [team] sees.
If you and the other {person} [team] choose the same slice each {of you} [player in the teams] will earn £5. If {you}
[your team] and the other {person} [team] chooses a different slice, {both of you} [you all] will earn nothing.
The experimenter has a pie made of paper. Raise your hand if you want to inspect it.
TASK B
In this type of task, {you} [your team] and the other {person} [team] will be presented with {a} [the same] pie with 
three slices, like the one shown below, and asked to choose one slice by clicking on your choice.
In each slice there are two amounts, represented by the letters ‘a’ and ‘b’ in the pie above. If {you} [your team] and 
the other {person} [team] choose the same slice {you} each member of your team] will earn the amount on the left of the
comma of the chosen slice {and} [while each member of] the other {person} [team] will earn the amount on the right. If you 
and the other {person} [team] choose a different slice you {both} [all] earn nothing in that task. In the actual experiment 
the letters will be replaced by numbers.
The orientation of the pie is randomly decided by the computer separately for each {person} [team] in the room. This 
means that, although {you} [your team] and the other {person} [team] will see the same pie, its orientation will vary. For 
example, {you} [your team] may see the pie above while the other {person} [team] may see the pie below. There is therefore 
no way for you to know what orientation the pie of the other {person} [team] sees.
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TASK C
In this type of tasks, you will be presented with a table similar to the one shown below. {You} [Your team] and the other 
{person} [team] will be assigned a colour. If {you are} [your team is] the Red {player} [team] then the other {person} [team] 
is the Blue {player} [team] and vice-versa. {You} [Your team] will be assigned a base, represented by a red square if {you 
are} [your team is] the Red {player} [team] or a blue square if {you are the} [your team is a] Blue {player} [team]. You will 
be told in each of these tasks whether {you are} [your team is] the Blue {player} [team] or the Red {player} [team].
There are two discs on the table. {You} [Your team] will be asked to choose one of these discs; you can do so by clicking 
on it. You earn the amount written inside the disc if the other {person} [team] has chosen the other disc. So, you earn some
money if {you and the other person} [both teams] choose a different disc. If {you} both [teams] choose the same disc you
[all] earn nothing.
[NOTE. The amounts displayed are the earnings per player NOT per team!]
[How to reach a team’s decision
In every task, you will be asked to make a suggestion. Once you have made and submitted your suggestion you will be 
shown both what you have suggested and what your team-mate has suggested. These suggestions may either be the same 
or different. You will be asked to chat with your team-mate before you can proceed. A team’s decision will be reached only 
if both you and your team-mate make the same suggestion and confirm it. You can revise your suggestions up to 5 times. If 
by then you and your team-mate have not reached the same suggestion, the computer will choose randomly for your team.]
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At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly choose one of the 11 rounds. Your earnings will be determined 
(as explained in the previous pages) by {your choice} [the choice of your team], the choice of the other {person} [team] and 
the type of task played in the randomly chosen round. In addition to whatever you have earned in that round, you will be 
given a show up fee of £5.
Appendix B. Level-k predictions
There are several models of level-k reasoning (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Camerer et al., 2004; Costa-Gomes and Craw-
ford, 2006). A common feature of these models is that players are assumed to maximise their own payoffs, and they are 
heterogeneous in terms of depth of reasoning. The lowest level, level-0 (L0 henceforth) players do not play strategically. In 
some models, they are assumed to choose at random; in other models, they are assumed to choose the option that favours 
themselves. Higher-level players form beliefs about what players who are one level below them would do and best respond 
to that behaviour.
In this appendix, we demonstrate that in coordination games involving conflicts of interest, group behaviour, as predicted 
by level-k theory, depends to a high degree on assumptions about the distribution of players’ depth of reasoning (i.e. 
levels), the size of the conflict (i.e. difference in payoffs), and the assumption about L0 players’ non-strategic behaviour. For 
simplicity, we first assume that L0 players will choose the option with the greater payoff for themselves with probability 
p > 1/2 (used in Crawford et al., 2008). This assumption helps us demonstrate how prediction changes with p, the size 
of the conflict, and the distribution of players’ depth of reasoning. We will later discuss how different assumptions on L0
behaviour will affect the prediction.
Let us define Player 1 as the player favoured by the choice the payoff-irrelevant cue suggests (i.e. the player who has 
the higher material payoffs than their co-player in the focal point) and Player 2 as the player not favoured by it (i.e. the 
player who has the lower material payoffs than their partner in the focal point). Based on this assumption, an L0 Player 1 
will choose the red slice (Rab) in the pie game and the close disc (C) in the bargaining table with probability p > 1/2, 
while an L0 Player 2 will choose Wba and the far disc (F) in the pie game and the bargaining game respectively with the 
same p > 1/2. An L1 Player 1’s best response depends on both p and the difference in payoffs a and b (see Table 3). Other 
things being equal, if the difference is small or p is large, an L1 Player 1 will choose Wba and an L1 Player 2 will choose 
Rab . L2 behaviour is the same as an L0, and L3 behaviour is the same as an L1 and so and so forth. If the difference in 
payoffs is big or p is small, L1 players will switch their behaviour and choose Rab if they are Player 1 and Wba if they are 
Player 2. The same applies to higher levels. Therefore, level-k predictions depend critically on the size of the conflict and p. 
Notice that specifying these two parameters is still not enough to give clear predictions on group behaviour. When we move 
from individuals to groups, we assume that groups’ depth of reasoning will be on the aggregate higher.17 However, without 
specifying the distribution of levels, we are unable to know how the distribution of odd and even level players will change, 
and this is critical to derive meaningful predictions.
Even if we were able to specify the distributions of levels in the population, level-k predictions will still be sensitive 
to the assumptions on L0’s behaviour. Consider the level-k theory proposed by Crawford et al. (2008) as an example. The 
model assumes that L0 only exists in the mind of the players and that the frequency of players with a level higher than 
two is negligible. As shown above, L0 players are assumed to choose the option with the greater payoff for themselves with 
probability p > 1/2. For simplicity, let’s assume p = 1, which means L0 always chooses the option that favours themselves. 
Under these assumptions, L0 Player 1 will choose the salient option (i.e. Rab or close disc),18 L1 Player 1 chooses the 
non-salient option that favours their partners (i.e. Wba or far disc), and L2 Player 1 will choose the same as L0 Player 1. 
Accordingly, the model predicts that Player 1 in the Group treatment is more likely to choose the salient option than Player 1 
in the Ind treatment. This is because the number of L2 players increases in the Group treatment. However, if L0’s behaviour 
is specified as choosing a random option, as some level-k models do, then L0 (L2) players in the new specification will 
behave the same as L0 (L1) in the old specification. Accordingly, the prediction of L2’s behaviour in the Group treatment 
will be different, depending on which assumption of L0’s behaviour is adopted.
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